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THE NEW MADONNAJWHORE SYNDROME:
FEMINISM, SEXUALITY, AND SEXUAL HARASSMENT
CATHY YOuNG*

I. WOMEN AS VICTIMS OF SEX:
VIEWS FROM LEFT AND RIGHT

The alliance between the anti-pornOgraphy wing of the feminist
movement and the religious right in the battle for censorship of sexually
explicit materials often has been described as an odd coalition, with
inevitable puns about politics and strange bedfellows. But, in fact, this
alliance is neither a purely incidental nor an opportunistic one. It is rooted
in striking, yet rarely noted, similarities between the two groups' views
of sexuality and of women as the weaker sex.
Much has been written recently about the "victim mentality" in
feminism.' Indeed, most of the feminist stories of the 1990s that have
taken on mythic dimensions-from Thelma and Louise and Susan Faludi's
Backlash to Anita Hill and the Palm Beach rape trial-feature an image of
women as victims of men or of a (male) societal conspiracy. Meanwhile,
on the right, advocates of traditional sex roles have created a parallel myth
of female victimology. In Enemies of Eros,' conservative writer Maggie
Gallagher argues that by normalizing premarital sex, divorce, and
maternal employment, the combined forces of the sexual revolution and
feminism allowed irresponsible men to abandon women, devalued the
work of homemakers and mothers, and pushed unwilling women into the
workplace.'
The feminist Faludi suggests that if many women worry about having
children before it's too late or, worse yet, decide to put their careers on
hold to stay home with those children, it is only because they have been
* Research Associate at the Cato Institute and Vice-President of the Women's
Freedom Network. Portions of this article are adapted from a chapter in her forthcoming
book, Gender Wars, to be published by The Free Press.
1. See, e.g., KATIE RonHE, THE MORNING AFrER: SEX, FEAR AND FEMMM ON
CAMPUS (1993); Jean Bethke Elshtain, Battered Reason, NEw REPUBLIC, Oct. 5, 1992,
at 25; Jean Bethke Elshtain, Trial by Fury, NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 6, 1993, at 32; Cathy
Young, VIctimhood is Powerful, REASON, Oct. 1992, at 19.
2. MAGGIE GALLAGHER, ENEMIES OF EROS: How THE SEXUAL REVOLUTION IS
KILLING FAMILY, MARRIAGE, AND SEx AND WHAT WE CAN Do ABoUT IT (1989).
3. See id. As Gallagher asserts, "[w]omen who must work also suffer from the great
disjunction between the amount of praise and respect they receive for working outside
the home, and the contempt society has for their work as mothers." Id. at 61.
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brainwashed by the media and by insidious conservative influence.4 The
anti-feminist Gallagher suggests that if many women put their careers first,
find full-time motherhood unsatisfying, or, worse yet, decide to forgo
marriage and children altogether, it is only because they have been
brainwashed by the media and by insidious feminist influence.' To both
authors, choices they find baffling and unpalatable must be proven not
merely wrong but somehow involuntary.
Clearly, feminists and traditionalists disagree emphatically on what
constitutes victimization of women, and often each side sees the other as
the victimizer. Gallagher finds victimization in the expectation that women
should pursue careers outside the home;6 Faludi, in the expectation that
they should put home and children ahead of careers.! But there is one
area in which the "new feminist" and anti-feminist versions of female
victimhood converge almost uncannily: sex.
A man exploits a woman every time he uses her body for sexual
pleasure while he is unwilling to accept the full burden of
paternity .... That is to say, single men (and frequently married
men) exploit women almost every time they make love. [The
woman] may consent, fully, knowledgeably, enthusiastically to
her exploitation. That does not change the nature of the
transaction!
Physically, the woman in intercourse is a space inhabited, a literal
territory occupied literally: occupied even if there has been no
4. See SusAN FALuDI, BACKLASH: THE UNDECLARED WAR AGAINST AM-RICAN
WOMEN (1991). For instance, Faludi suggests that "[alt the same time that '80s TV was
busy saluting the domestic angels of '50s TV, it was maligning mothers who dared step
outside the family circle." Id. at 155.
5. See GALLAGHER, supranote 2. For example, Gallagher writes that when women
enter the working world, "[w]omen's magazines, TV shows, [and] network anchors will
laud her decision to return to work; she is a modem-day heroine, a harbinger of the New
Woman, an example of female progress." id. at 61-62.
6. See id. Gallagher states that "[w]omen with children who do not work for pay
overwhelmingly report being made to feel intellectually and socially inferior." Id. at 60.
In addition, she posits that "[wiomen today are being punished... for supplying what
everyone wants and what society in fact needs us to provide: a strong, dependable love,
an emotional commitment that children can count on." Id. at 69.
7. See FALUDI, supra note 4. For example, Faludi believes that "[wiomen who
resist baby fever, by controlling their fertility or postponing motherhood, are shamed and
penalized." Id. at 133.
8. GALLAOHER, supra note 2, at 260-61.
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resistance, no force; even if the occupied person said yes please,
yes hurry, yes more.'
The first of these passages is from Gallagher's Enemies of Eros; the
second, from Andrea Dworldn's Intercourse.
Of course, the two viewpoints are not the same. Dworkin (whom
Gallagher criticizes for seeing femininity as negative but praises for
understanding that sex is "dangerous")"0 presumably makes no distinction

between marital and non-marital intercourse."

To Gallagher, sex is

exploitation only when the man is not prepared to support the child that
may be conceived (even if the woman, because of something like "false
consciousness," is equally unwilling-to paraphrase her words-to accept
the burden of maternity). 12 But the underlying logic is the same: women
are exploited even when they don't know they are being exploited; women

are raped even when they don't know they are being raped.13
Sexual conservatives subscribe to the view that, generally speaking,
men are interested in easy sex and women are interested in love and

intimacy, and that therefore strict sexual standards benefit women by

enabling them to withhold sex until they obtain commitment from men.
"'Sexual liberation' ...

has turned out to be-as it was destined to be-a

9. ANDREA DWORKIN, INTmcouRsE 133 (1987).

10. See GALlAGHER, supra note 2, at 257-58.
11. See DWORKIN, supranote 9, at 125-26, 164-67 (arguing that intercourse always
occurs in a context in which men have power over women, and that married women are
further dominated by the act of intercourse in that they have no right to refuse it).
12. GALLAGHER, supra note 2, at 260-61.
13. The most recent expression of the left-right convergenceis found in conservative
writer Charlotte Allen's guarded praise for feminist legal scholar (and Dworkin's
frequent ally) Catharine MacKinnon:
What is most attractive, and unsettling, about MacKinnon is the premise from
which she extrapolates-or, rather, the big lie she is taking on. MacKinnon
forces us to face the unpleasant fact that although we have created a fiction of
gender-blind egalitarianism, biology-along with the palpable differences
between the sexes it entails-remains intractable ....
...[Sihe is certainly right that the essence of pornography is the
depiction of sexual submission .... Men's fascination with pornography,
moreover, is a classic instance of the divergence between men and women
over Sex.
Charlotte Allen, Penthouse Pest: Why Porn CrusaderMacKinnon Is Right, WASH. POST,
Nov. 28, 1993, at Cl, C2. Allen also claims that sexual liberation left women with "no
effective vocabulary for turning down unwanted sex," citing as an example of coercion
an incident in which a man whose advances she rejected called her "middle class." Id.
at C2.
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male scam," writes neo-conservative commentator Irving Kristol. 4
"Easy, available sex is pleasing to men and debasing to women, who are
used and abused in the process.""5 Syndicated columnist Mona Charen
believes that the sexual revolution has led to
a profound loss of bargaining power for single women.
In the twinkling of an eye (a male eye), women abandoned
standards of sexual conduct which had protected them from
untempered male lust for millennia. ... Only [later] . . . did
women look at their
hands and recognize that they had given
16
away their trump.
In this scheme, female sexuality is a commodity to be traded to men in
exchange for guarantees of commitment (and presumably economic

support).
Meanwhile, the prominent feminist writer Germaine Greer also
characterizes sex, at least as currently practiced in our society, as a male
imposition on women:
Female sexuality still depends upon male demand, and male
demand is more genital-centered and more specific than women's
urge to express sensuality and tenderness .... The kind of sex
that leaves women pregnant is not the kind that gives them the
most intense pleasure, but it is the kind that they usually get. 7
While Greer appears to be saying that women most enjoy stimulation other
than intercourse, rather than that they are naturally chaste, her vision of
"genital-centered" male sexuality in contrast to women's "desire for
affection and closeness" 18 is not very far removed from Kristol's or
Charen's.
Thus, in his essay, Kristol, while averring that he has no sympathy for
such "militant" feminist goals as equal representation in government,
admits that "there are aspects of contemporary feminism that do evoke a
sympathetic response" in him-specifically, the ones that represent a
14. Irving Kristol, Reflections on Love and Family, WALL ST. J., Jan. 7, 1992, at
A10.

15.
16.
1990, at
17.
18.

Id.
Mona Charen, PayingDuesfor the SexualRevolution, N.Y. NEWSDAY, Jan. 22,
46.
Germaine Greer, The Backlash Myth, NEw REPuBLIc, Oct. 5, 1992, at 20,21.
Id. at 21.
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backlash against "'sexual liberation'" including "a hostility toward
pornography" and "a keen sensitivity to a phenomenon known as 'date
rape.' 19 Most feminists, says Kristol, finally seem to have realized that
"true equality between men and women can only be achieved by a moral
code that offers women some protection against male predators-and all
men are, to one degree or another, natural predators when it comes to
sex. "20

II. "PROTECTIVE FEMINISM":

THE LEGAL PRESUMPTION OF FEMALE VULNERABILITY
This view of men as sexually predatory and women as sexually
vulnerable was at the root not only of traditional moral codes but of much
traditional legislation. These legal norms were vigorously challenged by
feminists in the 1970s. Thus, in the 1977 study Sex Bias in the U.S.
Code," future Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Brenda
Feigen-Fasteau urged the repeal of the 1910 Mann Act,' which
prohibited the interstate transportation of women and girls "for the
purpose of prostitution or debauchery, or for any other immoral
purpose."' They cited not only "the invasion of privacy issue" but the
underlying paternalistic assumptions about women: "The Mann Act...
is offensive because of the image of women it perpetuates ....
[T]he act
was meant to protect weak women from bad men."' The authors also
called for a "sex-neutral" definition of statutory rape to replace the
traditional language describing the victim as an underage female.' It is
noteworthy that Ginsburg's position sparked vehement attacks both from
anti-ERA activist Phyllis Schlafly, who accused Ginsburg of promoting
"extremist feminist concepts,"' and from "new feminist" legal scholars
19. See Kristol, supra note 14, at A10.
20. Id.
21. RUTH BADER GINSBURG & BRENDA FEIGEN-FASTEAU, U.S. COMM'N ON CIV.

RiOiHTs, SEX BIAS IN THE U.S. CODE (1977).
22. See id. at 97-99, 103.
23. White-Slave Traffic [Mann] Act, ch. 395, 36 Stat. 825 (1910) (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2421-2424 (1988)).
24. GINSBURG & FEIGEN-FASTEAU, supra note 21, at 98-99.
25. See id. at 95, 102.
26. Ruth Bader Ginsburg'sFeministWorld View, PHYLUS SCHLAFLY REPORT, July

1993, § 1.
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such as Mary Becker of the University of Chicago, who accused her of
promoting "assimilationist" and "phallocentric" doctrines.'
The "new feminism," in its preoccupation with the sexual "harm"
inflicted on women by men-pornography, sexual harassment, and rape
(all of which are conflated into a single "continuum" of sexual
violence)-inevitably mirrors and reinforces traditional paternalism toward
women. It might be appropriate, then, to characterize the "new feminists"
as "protective feminists."
To the extent that the process of legal reform initiated by the "equality
feminism" of the 1970s continues, it often collides in paradoxical ways
with the legal initiatives of protective feminism. Thus, in May of 1993,
the South Carolina Supreme Court struck down a state law prohibiting
"any obscene, profane, indecent, vulgar, suggestive or immoral message"
that was spoken or written to a "woman or woman child"' on the
grounds that it constituted unequal protection and was based on "'old
notions'" of sex differences. (The case concerned a teenage male
convicted of using obscenity to threaten a fifteen-year-old girl.) At the
same time, however, the California State Assembly is considering a bill
that would impose a fine for sexual harassment, 1 such as obscene
remarks.
On the surface, the new protective laws are frequently gender-neutral.
For example, a Massachusetts bill proposed in 1992, which defines
pornography as "a practice of sex discrimination . . . that differentially
harms and disadvantages women" 2 and allows women to bring
discrimination complaints against producers or distributors of sexually
explicit materials, contains the provision that "[a]ny man, child, or
transsexual who alleges injury by pornography in the way women are
injured by it may also complain." 33 However, this is obviously no more
than a pro forma concession to equal protection.
27. See Mary E. Becker, Prince Charming: Abstract Equality, 1987 SuP. CT. REV.
201, 207-09, 211-17, 219-24.
28. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-15-250 (Law. Co-op. 1985).
29. In re Joseph T., 430 S.E.2d 523,524 (S.C. 1993) (quoting Craig v. Boren, 429
U.S. 190 (1976)).
30. See id. at 524.
31. S. 612, 1993-94 Sess., § 1.5(1)-(2) (1993). The bill states that all people have
a right to be free from "unwelcome and persistent, or severe sexual advances" that are

intimidating or threaten violence. Id.
32. An Act to Protect the Civil Rights of Women and Children, H.R. 5194, Mass.
177th Gen. Ct., 1992 Sess., § 1 (1992) (unenacted; not yet reified as of 1993 Session).
33. Id. § 2(2)(e).
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The issue of sexual harassment, at least insofar as "hostile
environment" harassment cases are concerned, is closely linked to the
issue of restrictions on sexual expression. It is no coincidence that
Catharine MacKinnon, the leading protective feminist theorist on both
issues, speaks of a legal tendency to see "a convergence of pornography
and sexual harassment." ' "Pornography" is seen both as leading to
sexual harassment (as in the lawsuit against Stroh's Brewery, in which two
female employees alleged that the company's "Swedish bikini team" beer
commercials, not legally obscene but certainly "objectifying" women,
created a harassment-supportive atmosphere35) and as constituting sexual
harassment. Current sexual-harassment law and feminist theory, therefore,
offer a good opportunity to examine the thin line that separates protecting
women's individual rights from affording women special safeguards, as
well as the way in which these safeguards can reinforce stereotypes about
women and female sexuality.
111. SEXuAL HARASSMENT:
THE "REASONABLE WOMAN" AND THE VIRTUOUS WOMAN

At a birthday party in my office, the celebrant was feted with a

cake in the shape of male genitals. The cake was devoured with
great gusto, to the mirth and entertainment of many of those

present and the intense discomfort of others. The cake was
presented to a woman by the other women in the office. Those

most uncomfortable were men.'
This episode was recounted by a male television producer struggling
to make sense, in the wake of the Clarence Thomas hearings, of the new
rules governing sexual conduct between men and women at the office. In
another incident described to me personally, a young male employee at an
office Christmas party was rather startled to receive from several female
co-workers a "gag gift" of a pair of red silk undershorts with a card
inscribed "To the sexiest guy at the office." If the roles had been
reversed-that is to say, if the men in an office had conspicuously enjoyed
a cake shaped as a woman's breast or genitals, or presented a female coworker with erotic lingerie-it is likely that in the current social climate,
34. Fred Strebeigh, Defining Law on the Feminist Frontier, N.Y. TvfMs, Oct. 6,
1991, § 6 (Magazine), at 28, 29 (quoting MacKinnon discussing her amicus curiae brief
in Thoreson v. Penthouse, 583 N.Y.S.2d 213 (App. Div.1992)).
35. See Rorie Sherman, Stroh's Case Plaintiffs Take Case to Public, NATL L.J.,
Dec. 30, 1991, at 7.
36. Wtlliam Broyles Jr., Public Policy, PrivateRitual, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 1991,
at A25.
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such behavior would have been widely perceived as sexual harassment.
But could the men in either incident have made such a complaint?

So far, no court has given a definitive answer to that question.
However, ina passage in the 1990 Drinkwater v. Union Carbide Corp.
opinion,' the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit considered the
possibility that in cases of this nature only women can bring a valid claim
of harassment:
In the quid pro quo cases, sexual harassment claims are equally
available to men and women, but non-quid pro quo hostile
environment cases depend on the underlying theory that
"[w]omen's sexuality largely defines women as women in this
society, so violations of it are abuses of women as
women." ... The theory posits that there is a sexual power
asymmetry between men and women and that, because men's
sexuality does not define men as men in this society, a man's
hostile environment claim, although theoretically possible, will be
much harder to plead and prove.38
In the landmark 1991 case Ellison v. Brady,* a Ninth Circuit panel ruled
two-to-one that sexual-harassment claims (involving female plaintiffs)
should be reviewed under a "reasonable woman" standard rather than the
gender-neutral "reasonable person" standard under which the case had
previously been dismissed by the district court.' In his ruling, Judge
Robert K. Beezer stated that "a sex-blind reasonable person standard tends
to . . .systematically ignore the experiences of women." 41 Citing the
work of feminist legal scholar Kathryn Abrams, Beezer wrote of women's
"common concerns" based on their disproportionately high risk of
victimization by sexual assault.42 Therefore, it was reasonable for the
plaintiff to have felt threatened by a co-worker's persistent "love letters"
indicating an obsessive and somewhat delusional infatuation with her, even
though a man might have found the same behavior trivial and harmless.'
Thus, under a "reasonable woman" standard, it appears that the
proposed California law against sexual harassment would be no more
37. 904 F.2d 853 (3d Cir. 1990).
38. Id. at 861 n.15 (quoting CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT
op.WORKNo WOME 174 (1979)).
39. 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991).
40.
41.
42.
43.

See id. at 878-81.
Id. at 879.
See id.
See id. at 880.
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gender-neutral in its application than the traditional laws prohibiting the
use of obscene language toward women. The argument would be that
sexual remarks or even leers in the street harm women because they raise
legitimate fears of sexual violence; a man subjected to such conduct would
not suffer the same harm and therefore would not be entitled to the same
protection.
In an interesting analysis of the "reasonable woman" standard,
University of Iowa College of Law professor Martha Chamallas writes,
"[u]ndeniably, the reasonable woman standard is asymmetric; it is
premised on an explicit gender distinction and calls for nonidentical
treatment of men and women."" This asymmetry is not discriminatory
but desirable, "because it would promote substantive equality for
women."' Chamallas admits, however, that the danger of a conservative
interpretation of sex differences as natural and rooted in biology "is
present each time gender difference is discussed, unless very careful
attention is paid to the social origins of the differences."' She expresses
concern that some of the language in Ellison implies that there may also
be a male perspective in cases involving male plaintiffs, which suggests
a "two-way street image of sexual harassment"47 and "would seem to
require parallel treatment of men and women"" rather than a specific
effort to redistribute power from men to women. Finally, Chamallas
worries that the hypothetical "reasonable woman" might be equated with
the actual average woman "who has found a way to cope with, but not to
challenge, sexually harassing conduct."4 The standard that she proposes
(and for which she finds partial support in Judge Howell W. Melton's
opinion in Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc. ,' decided in 1991)

would define a reasonable woman's perspective as one that "might
reasonably be taken by women consciously interested in improving their
status in the workplace."" The underlying assumption is that such a
"reasonable woman" would take the view that "sexualization" in the
workplace is inevitably detrimental to women's status.
One obvious problem with Chamallas' approach is that it explicitly
rejects the protection of individual rights as the animating force behind
44. Martha Chamalas, Feminist ConstructionsofObjectivity: Multiple Perspectives
in Sexual and Racial HarassmentLitigation, 1 TEx. J. WOMEN & L. 95, 108 (1992).
45. Id.
46. Id. at 124.

47. See id. at 125.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 135.
50. 760 F. Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla. 1991).

51. Chamallas, supra note 44, at 135.
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sexual-harassment laws; the only legitimate goal is to promote the interests
of women as a group.2 There is, however, no reason to assume that the
collective interests of women as perceived by Chamallas or MacKinnon

are any more genuine than the collective interests of women as perceived
by Charen or Schlafly; therefore, they are no more suitable as a basis for

legislation.
Moreover, the belief that in modem Western societies men and
women are divided by an absolute "sexual power asymmetry" and shaped
completely by their membership in "dominant and subordinate groups" is
just as questionable as the traditional view of immutable male-female
differences and naturally ordained sex roles. Oft-cited examples of this
"asymmetry" are open to challenge as well. Thus, Chamallas points out
that "criticisms of women often involve . . . discussions of sexual

preferences and experiences"53 as evidence of society's tendency to
define women, but not men, by their sexuality. Yet one may argue that
insults directed at men, too, are often couched in sexual terms. And to
take a specific case, many men would undoubtedly quarrel with the

assumption in Ellison that obsessive sexual pursuit by a woman with
delusional fantasies would not be threatening or at least highly disturbing
to them. (One could even point to some recent films as proof that the fear

of such pursuit is clearly present in the male psyche. M )
Indeed, some commentators on gender issues have proposed that it is
women who have superior "sexual power" (whether because of biology

or culture), insofar as sex is perceived as a favor women grant to men,
and female beauty is prized more highly than male beauty.55 In a study
52. For a discussionof an individual-oriented approach to sexual-harassmentelaims,

see Ellen Frankel Paul, Sexual Harassnentas Sex Discriznination:A Defective Paradigm,
8 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 333 (1990).

53. Chamallas, supra note 44, at 116 n.110 (citing the testimony of expert witness
Dr. Susan Fiske in Jacksonville Shipyards).
54. See, e.g., FATALATrRACrIoN(Paramount 1987); THETEIMP (Paramount 1993);
THE CRUSH (Warner Bros. 1993); see also ROIPHE, supra note 1, at 166 (explaining that
this common ambivalence about sex is depicted in several recent feature films in which
"[m]orality mixes with the fear of sex to produce a new kind of erotic thriller... with
the message that killing is sexy and sex kills").
55. See, e.g., WARREN FARRELL, THEMYTH OF MALE POWVER 85 (1993) ("female
beauty is the world's most potent drug.... Throughout history, the only constant about
female beauty and female sex was that they were more valued than male beauty and male
sex."); CAMILLE PAGLIA, SEx, ART, AND AMERICAN CULTuRE 62 (1992) ("We have
what they want. I think woman is the dominant sex. Men have to do all sorts of stuff to
prove they are worthy of a woman's attention."); DAVID THOMAS, NOT GUILTY: THE
CASE IN DEFENSE OF MEN 162-63 (1993) ("'Women initiate sex, really. It's the woman
who's in charge. We make all the choices, we make the decisions, because we invest all
the time involved in producing a baby.'" (quoting Claire Rayner)).
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of female sexuality, sex researcher Carol Cassell asserts that many women
have absorbed the subconscious message that sex is their most important
asset if rationed: "To be blunt, sex has historically been a commodity. It's
a valuable source of power . . .

Sexual power is . . . the female

commodity,"' writes Cassell. "A man may ask [for sex], but a woman
controls through her answer. So a woman not only has the real power, she
wields it over a man when he is most vulnerable, in having given in to his
need for her."5 7 "Men's advocates" could claim that a "male

perspective" on sexual harassment should incorporate an understanding of
the discomfort or tension that sexually provocative female dress or body

language produces in men.' While this complaint can be easily
interpreted as a "she was asking for it" defense for assaultive behavior,
materials in popular women's magazines can be cited to support the
contention that clothes and body language are indeed used to send sexual

signals." If sexual harassment can include so physically intangible an
invasion as a leer, why not a miniskirt? Or, to take a different angle, if
women's greater risk of sexual violence puts them in need of special
protection from remarks or stares that have the potential to inspire fear of

such assault, could men's higher risk of non-sexual physical assault

(coupled with social pressure not to back away from a fight) require
special legal protections against aggressive verbal or body language

directed at men?
Although Chamallas is reluctant to accept the real-life "average
woman" (whoever she is) as a fitting "reasonable woman" to serve as a
yardstick in sexual harassment claims, she is quite willing to invoke the
apparent views of real-life women when exploring gender differences in
perceptions of sexual conduct in the workplace. Both sheW and another
56. CAROL CASSELL, SWEPT AWAY: WHY WOMEN FEAR THEIR OWN SEXUALITY

34-35 (1984).
57. Id. at 150. Of course, this power is a rather self-defeating one in that it involves
the woman's denial of her own pleasure in sex.
58. See, e.g., FARRELL, supranote 55, at 289-91, 299-300 (arguing that "workplace
flirtation," which the author defines as "[s]uggestive dress, flirtatious eye contact," etc.,
is a form of harassment that "has been totally ignored by the EEOC and, therefore, can
be done by women, free of risk"); THOMAS, supra note 55, at 136 (explaining that many
men "feel that the overt sexuality of some women's clothes . . .constitutes a form
of... passive harassment. It exploits a man's sexual responses, despite the women's
claim to have quite different intentions."). For a woman's comment supporting this view,
see BETH MJLwiD, WORKING WITH MEN 119-20 (Berkley Books 1990) (originally
published as WHAT You GET WHEN You GO FOR IT (Dodd, Mead & Co. 1987)).

59. See, e.g., How to Make an Impact on a Man, COSMOPOLITAN, Feb. 1989, at
60. See Charnallas, supra note 44, at 111-17.
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leading feminist legal theorist on sexual harassment, Kathryn Abrams, 61
refer to studies, particularly the work of Barbara A. Gutek, 62 showing
that most women consider sexual overtures in the workplace offensive
while most men consider them flattering,' and that women tend to find
sexualized behavior in the workplace (such as lewd jokes) more
objectionable than do men.' Both Abrams and Chamallas emphasize that
these differences should be seen as rooted not in nature, or even in
socialization, but in the imbalance of power between men and women
(even those of ostensibly equal status at work). When Chamallas refers to
differences between the sexes, she pauses to add, "or, more properly,
between dominant and subordinate groups."' Sex is thus made analogous
to race or ethnicity, suggesting that, just as racial humor or teasing in the
workplace is clearly offensive and discriminatory toward minorities, so
sexual humor is invariably offensive and discriminatory toward women.
In a concurring opinion in the recent sexual harassment case, Harris
v. Forklift Systems, Inc.,' Ruth Bader Ginsburg appears to be leaning
toward such a standard when she writes, "The critical issue . . . is
whether members of one sex are exposed to disadvantageous terms or
conditions of employment to which members of the other sex are not
exposed."67 This suggests that any behavior by a male co-worker or
supervisor that treats a female employee differently than a male
employee-for instance, compliments having to do with attractiveness-can
be considered discriminatory and harassing. Yet the analogy is reductive.
It discounts the fact that sexuality is an important and legitimate part of
life and that a particular sexual dynamic between men and women is likely
to persist even in a fully egalitarian society. If this is accepted, then sexual
equality means not liberating women from being viewed by men at least
partly in sexual terms, but liberating women to treat men as "sexual
objects." Curiously, this approach was illustrated by none other than
Justice Ginsburg herself when, during her confirmation hearings, she
61. Kathryn Abrams, Gender Discrimination and the Transfonnation of Workplace
Norms, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1183, 1198 n.57 (1989).
62. BARBARA A. GuTEK, SEx AND THE WoRKPLACE: THE IMPACT OF SEXUAL
BEHAVIOR AND HARASSMENT ON WOMEN, MEN, AND ORGANIZATIONS (1985).
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

See id. at 96-98.
See id. at 125-27.
ChamaUas, supra note 44, at 99.
114 S. Ct. 367, 372 (1993) (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
Id. at 372.
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related an anecdote about a case, Diaz v. Pan American World Airways,6
in which a man sued an airline for refusing to hire him as a flight
attendant:
I was having lunch with some law school colleagues at the
U.N. dining room. . . . And one of the men said to me, "I
understand what you are doing, Ruth, and it is great you are all
for equality, and we are, too. But some of this is getting beyond
reason. You know about that case of a guy who wants to be a
stewardess? Isn't that silly?"
The waitress serving our table came to my aid. She said,
"Pardon me, but I couldn't help overhearing your conversation.
I just came back to the United States on Alitalia, and on that
plane there was the most adorable steward." The men turned to
me, and one said, "Ruth, do women look at men that way?" And
I said, "You're dam right we do." '
The analogy between sexualized conduct toward women and
differential treatment based on race also ignores the fact that, while racial
humor is invariably racist, sexual humor is not invariably sexist, unless
one assumes that anything sexual is invariably degrading to women but not
to men. (In 1992, the commander of the U.S. Navy Pacific Fleet, Adm.
Robert Kelly, was reprimanded for making a sexually explicit joke at a
staff meeting.' News reports said that the joke "made reference to male
genitals," yet it was characterized as "sexually demeaning behavior toward
women. "7)
Feminist theorists often argue that laws against sexual harassment
target coercion and abuse of power rather than flirting or sexual
interaction,' and feminist commentators have made the same point in the
media in response to accusations of puritanism: "Sexual harassment isn't
68. 442 F.2d 385, 389 (5th Cir. 1971) (holding that the airline's policy of excluding

men from flight-attendant positions solely because of their gender violated the 1964 Civil
Rights Act).
69. Nomination of Ruth Bader Ginsburg to be Associate Justice of the Supreme
Court of the United States: HearingsBefore the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d
Cong., 1st Sess. 135 (1993).
70. See Pacfic Fleet CommanderRebukedfor Sexual Joke, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25,
1992, at 32.
71. Id. (emphasis added).
72. See, e.g., Barbara A. Gutek & Vera Dunwoody, Understanding Sex in the
Workplace, in 2 WOMEN AND WORK: AN ANNUAL REviEw 249, 253 (Ann Stromberg
et al. eds., 1987); Abrams, supra note 61, at 1199-1200; Chamallas, supra note 44, at
99-103; Susan Estrich, Sex at Work, 43 STAN. L. REv. 813, 821 (1991).
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about sex. It's about the abuse of power," ' writes New York journalist
L.A. Winokur. Yet common definitions of harassment include any sexual
overtures or comments perceived by the woman as offensive,7 4 and
personal accounts of what is regarded as harassment often appear to
involve nothing more than unwanted expressions of sexual interest. Thus,
Winokur describes an incident in which a man who had been one of her
regular sources for three years told her over drinks that he had always
wanted to have an affair with her. "Whether or not it constituted
harassment may be up for grabs, though I certainly know where I stand
on the matter,"75 she states-despite acknowledging that once she had
made it clear
that she was not interested, "that [was] all it took to fend
76
him off."
Some scholars take a similarly broad view of what sort of sexual
interactions should be restricted. Gutek and Dunwoody make a distinction
between harassment and "nonharassing" behaviors such as sexual
compliments, jokes, or requests for dates by co-workers. But, in a curious
choice of words, they label these behaviors as "sexual nonharassment" 7
(which is somewhat akin to referring to consensual sex as "sexual
nonassault" or "nonrape") and suggest, on the basis of one of Gutek's
studies, that such interactions may be detrimental to women even if the
women are not aware of any harm. 8 Susan Estrich is quite blunt about
her view that all opportunities for sexual interaction in the workplace are
bad for women and are something that "most women . . . do not even
want: ""

For my part, I would have no objection to rules which prohibited
men and women from sexual relations in the workplace, at least
with those who worked directly for them. Men and women could,
of course, violate the rule; but the power to complain, once in the
73. L. A. Winokur, The Sexual-HarassmentDebates, PRoORESSIVE, Nov. 1993, at
37, 39.
74. See Abrams, supra note 61, at 1206-09; Estrich, supra note 72, at 841-42.
75. Winokur, supra note 73, at 37.
76. Id.at 38.
77. See Gutek & Dunwoody, supra note 72, at 255.
78. See id. at 258.
79. Estrich, supranote 72, at 860. Estrich refers to studies that supposedly support
her contention. However, the fact that most women would find it offensive to be directly
propositioned for sex does not mean that they are not at all interested in sexual/romantic
relationships with co-workers.
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hands of the less powerful, might well "chill" sexual relations by
evening the balance of power between the two.'
It appears to be true that women are far more likely than men to
consider at least certain forms of sexualized conduct in the workplace
objectionable 8 -although, as with all gender differences, this one should
not be absolutized. In one recent survey, fifty-one percent of working
women (albeit compared to eighty percent of their male counterparts)
admitted to having had sexual thoughts about their co-workers.m2 There
is also much anecdotal evidence that women do engage in sexually tinged
behavior at work.' For example, the same commentator whose account
of the office birthday party with the naughty cake was cited above (and
who is admittedly male, which one hopes is not a disqualification)
observes:
Over the past 20 years, I have seen a steady increase in frank
language and sexual innuendo, much of it coming from the
women, no matter whether they were my boss or the lowest
subordinate. The tougher the job and the greater the pressure, the
franker the language and the more intense the sexual
atmosphere."
To the extent, however, that a gender gap exists in this area, it stems
not only, and perhaps not primarily, from "power asymmetry" but from
a number of conventional notions about male and female sexual norms and
sexual natures-notions that have been considerably eroded by feminism
but are by no means extinct. First, there is the assumption of male
promiscuity and female selectivity. A man is assumed to be interested in
sex with just about any attractive woman; when he propositions a woman,
especially outside the context of a romantic relationship, she can be
expected to read it as a signal that he considers her sexually
available-i.e., "cheap"-and reasonably feel offended. A woman, on the
80. Id. It is hard to know whether Estrich is being ironic when she adds that "in
cases of true love, one could . . . transfer to another department, or even trust the

woman not to file a lawsuit." Id.
81. According to one of Gutek's surveys, 67 percent of men, but only 17 percent
of women, said that they would be flattered if a co-worker propositioned them. See
GUTEK, supra note 62, at 96-98.
82. EXEC., Summer 1993, at 56.
83. See, e.g., Susan White, Infidelity: Women Who Cheat, NEW WOMAN, Jan.
1992, at 50-53 (arguing that magazines directed at "liberal" women often treat the
workplace as a sexual playground).
84. Broyles, supranote 36, at A25.
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other hand, is assumed to be selective; when she propositions a man, he
can be expected to read it as a signal that she has singled him out, and
reasonably feel flattered. In addition, sex is traditionally seen as
possession of the woman by the man. When psychologist and management
consultant Dr. Beth Milwid interviewed 125 professional women for a
book on women in the workplace, this point was emphasized by several
of her subjects:
[I]t's all right for a man to meet a woman at work, because it's
perfectly acceptable for a man to sleep around. But it is definitely
not acceptable for a woman. . . . If you go out with somebody
from the office, and it gets around that you slept with the guy,
you're automatically labeled a whore.'
You've got to remember that when a woman gets sexually
involved with a man, the man is conquering .... The woman is
seen as the person giving in.... It may sound terrible, but the
double standard still exists.'
Consequently, comments from a man to a woman indicating that he sees
her as an object of sexual attention are perceived as degrading, while
indications of sexual attention from a woman are not seen as degrading to
a man. An interesting example of this double standard is found in the
autobiography of Rush Limbaugh, the right-wing radio talk show host:
I had a bad sore throat and my voice was somewhat weak. This
woman called and said she had the perfect cure. I said, "Hmm,
what is it?" She said: "A throat massage. With my tongue." I
was stunned and incredulous, totally taken aback. But-and this
is the important thing-I was not offended. I laughed and told her
I found her idea intriguing.
I confess, I liked that
exchange....
Well, I got [an electronic mail] note . . .from a guy who
asked me to imagine how much outrage there would have been if
a female talk show host had been told that by a male caller. The
guy was right. Think about it. There would have been hysterical
accusations of sexism, vulgarity, and obscenity.'
To Limbaugh, this is an example of God-given differences between
men and women-"[j]ust another one of those natural differences that
85. MILwID, supra note 58, at 115.
86. Id. at 123.
87. RUSH H. LIMBAUGH, III, THE WAY THINGs OuGHT To BE 144 (1993).
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feminists find offensive and bothersome,"' he adds (blissfully unaware
of the extent to which many feminists have emphasized gender differences
in this area). He is right, of course, that a gender role reversal would have
cast such a comment in an entirely different light. But, God-given
differences aside, why? Clearly, what is at work here is the residual belief
that when a man treats a woman as a sexual object, he establishes his
dominance over her; when a woman treats a man as a sexual object, she
places herself in his service.

Another aspect of this dichotomy is the "madonna/whore syndrome,"
which translates into the more modem "bimbo/brain syndrome": a woman
can be either respectable or sexually desirable, either a "sex object" or a
professional, but not both. Gutek and Dunwoody write:
[B]eing sexual and being a sex object are aspects of the female
sex role that frequently are carried over to the workplace by both
men and women....
Unfortunately, women do not seem to be able to be sex
objects and analytical, rational, competitive, and assertive at the
same time because femaleness is viewed as "not-maleness" ...
and it is the men who are viewed as analytical, logical, and
assertive.'
Restricting what Abrams calls "devaluative sexualization"I in the
workplace will do nothing to change these stereotypes or these social
standards. It may even strengthen them by reinforcing the perception that
sexuality devalues women. "Treatment that sexualizes women workers
prevents them from feeling, and prevents others from perceiving them, as
equal in the workplace," 9 writes Abrams.' Yet arguably, from the
88. Id.
89. Gutek & Dunwoody, supra note 72, at 262. It is interesting to note that all the
studies cited by Gutek and Dunwoody as evidence of these sexual stereotypes date back
to the 1970s.

90. Abrams, supranote 61, at 1211 & n.116.
91. Id. at 1209.
92. Abrams' argument is based on the premise that sex generally tends to be, for
women, a negative experience: "Because of the inequality and coercion with which it is
so frequently associated in the minds of women, the appearance of sexuality in an
unexpected context or a setting of ostensible equality can be an anguishing experience."
Id. at 1205. She concedes that "many women hold positive attitudes about uncoerced
sex," id., but seeks to "balance" this statement with a reference to Dworkin's
Intercourse, as if positive female attitudes toward consensual sex and Dworkin's
view-which Abrams summarizes as "sexual intercourse is inherently coercive and
contributes inevitably to the subordination of women"-were equally widespread. Id. at
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feminist point of view, these standards are not beneficial insofar as they
prevent women from combining sexuality and personhood-which even
Gutek and Dunwoody regard as "troublesome,"' and which was a
subject of frustration for many of those interviewed by Milwid. ("This is
about never letting your hair down, never letting them see that you're
really a fun person..... It's sad, because I find you can't be yourself a
lot of the time."9)

Moreover, some have argued that hypersensitivity to possible
perceptions of sexual impropriety makes men feel ill at ease when there
are "ladies present," thus inhibiting women's professional advancement
and resulting in subtle exclusion from the workplace social
environment.95 This is not to say that men who do not feel at ease unless
they are free to utter sexist slurs or to fondle any woman who happens to
be nearby should be accommodated (and it is hard to see what women
could gain from inclusion in such a social environment). But when male
college professors feel that they must leave the office door open when a
female student comes in for a teacher-student conference,' when male
supervisors hesitate to invite a female employee for a social drink, or even
when a ribald story or joke is shared by male employees but female coworkers are left out, such an atmosphere can harm women in very real
ways. In addition, given that women too engage in sexualized conduct in
the workplace-from sexual jokes and innuendo to displays of calendars
featuring male models-it seems likely that many women may eventually
find themselves on the receiving end of complaints over essentially
harmless behavior. On the other hand, if the application of differential
rules suggested by the "reasonable woman" standard" means that women
are allowed to engage in conduct prohibited for men, this is likely to
create even greater resentment in male workers and lead to a truly hostile
environment.
n.94.
93. Gutek & Dunwoody, supra note 72, at 262.
94. MILWID, supra note 58, at 124. Chamallas, too, acknowledges that "[n]o
consensus exists among feminists... about whether apparently consensual relationships
between supervisors and employees or between co-workers should be prohibited because
of the potential they pose for creating a sexualized workplace that encourages sexual
harassment" and that "women possess many differing interests." Chamallas, supra note
44, at 136.
95. See RoIPHE, supra note 1, at 90-95 (arguing that fear of accusations of sexual
harassment leads to suspicion and distrust among co-workers and among male faculty and
female students, resulting in fewer professional and academic opportunities for women).
96. See id. at 92.

97. See supra notes 36-65 and accompanying text.
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Of course, changing a centuries-old double standard is far more
difficult than cracking down on alleged sexual misconduct in the
workplace or in the streets. But if empowering women to combine
sexuality and personhood and challenging stereotypes of male and female
sexual sensibilities are legitimate feminist goals, then perhaps the
"reasonable woman" is not someone acutely aware of the dangers of
"sexualization," but rather someone more like the manager who gave
Milwid this account of dealing with sexual advances from co-workers and
customers:
The first time it happened, it bothered me a lot. . .

.I

thought that to them I wasn't a whole person anymore. I was just
the person in the centerfold. I felt then that somehow their
interest in me sexually meant that I wasn't powerful or that I
wasn't being professional.
Now, I just think it means that I'm attractive. And I like
that.... If I'm not interested in them, I'm not interested. But

being a sexually alive person doesn't mean you're not powerful,
and it certainly doesn't mean you aren't capable."
IV. PROTECTIVE FEMINISM vERsus PATERNALISM:
ATTEMPTING TO DRAW THE LINES

Is it possible to establish gender-specific, special protections for
women from sexual harassment or pornography without boosting
traditional "essentialist" ideas of male and female natures?
Many protective feminists who address this issue, such as Chamallas
and Abrams, believe that such a risk can be avoided as long as women
have a strong voice in formulating the new legal norms, and as long as
these norms are clearly based, not on traditional concepts of biological
differences or female virtue and chastity, but on feminist concepts of
power, inequality, and harm.' Thus, it is acceptable to say that women
"hold more restrictive views [than men] of both the situation and the type
of relationship in which sexual conduct is appropriate"" ° because
women are at higher risk of sexual assault; it would be unacceptable,
however, to make the same generalization about women on the grounds
that women's childbearing role makes them more predisposed to invest
emotionally in relationships and to regard casual sex as harmful.
98. MILWM, supranote 58, at 126.
99. See, e.g., Abrams, supra note 61, at 1188-89; Chamallas, supra note 44, at

104-05.
100. Abrams, supra note 61, at 1205.
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However, this seems to be a dubious distinction. Chamallas herself
writes that although Ellison v. Brady' (which was handed down by two
Reagan appointees!") employs ostensibly feminist language about
women's distinct perspective rooted in experience, it also contains
passages that seem to endorse some version of a "separate spheres"
philosophy.'
Moreover, there is ample evidence that social
conservatives who favor traditional sex roles are remarkably comfortable
with the language of protective feminism. Kristol's comment that "true
equality between men and women can only be achieved by a moral code
that offers women some protection against male predators"" °4 echoes-in
all probability, unwittingly-the argument of Christine Littleton, Martha
Chamallas, and other protective feminists that "asymmetric" treatment for
women is needed to achieve "substantive equality."
Further to the right, syndicated columnist and former Moral Majority
director Cal Thomas praises the 1992 ruling of the Canadian Supreme
Court"es that for the first time gave a stamp of judicial approval to the
theory that pornography is a form of anti-woman bias: "In addition to
upholding the obscenity provision . . . [the] Canadian court redefined

obscenity to mean that which subordinates or degrades women .... [It]
found that the right of women to be protected from men who would cause
them harm is greater than the right of these same men to purchase
pornography ....

"11

Enumerating the ways in which women are

victimized by pornography, Thomas speculates that "men who are
consumers of pornography will... tend to view their female co-workers
and subordinates as less than equal." °7
Of course, in the eyes of many feminists, the Bible "subordinates and
degrades women" too; one may certainly suppose that men who accept
Biblical teachings about women will "tend to view their female co-workers
and subordinates as less than equal." But Thomas, evidently, is not
bothered by such contradictions.
101. 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991).
102. See id. at 873 (The opinion was handed down by Judges Beezer and Kozinski,
both Reagan appointees).
103. See Chamallas, supra note 44, at 125.
104. Kristol, supra note 14, at Alo.
105. R. v. Butler, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 452, 479 (Can.) (stating that "degrading or
dehumanizing materials place women (and sometimes men) in positions of subordination,
servile submission or humiliation" and "run against the principles of equity and dignity
of all human beings").
106. Cal Thomas, No Free Speechfor PornographersinCanada,BALT. SUN, Mar.
6, 1992, at A13.
107. Id.
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To the extent that our thinking is influenced by existing social norms,
it is a natural temptation to slide into traditional concepts when
considering restrictions on sexual conduct. A striking example of this
tendency was provided by a Time/CNN poll taken days after Anita Hill's
testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee, testimony widely
regarded as a national "teach-in" on the feminist perspective on sexual
harassment. In this survey, a male supervisor "discussing pornographic
acts" with a female subordinate was more likely to be perceived as guilty
of sexual harassment than a male supervisor who pressured a female
subordinate for sex. 8 If the feminist perspective on the issue is that
sexual harassment is not about decency but about coercion, for a large
portion of the public the "teach-in" had obviously failed.
A recent cartoon on the subject shows an agitated man telling a female
co-worker about his frustration with the new rules: "If I ask you for a date
and you want to go, it's an office romance! But if you don't want to go,
it's sexual harassment! . .. How's a guy supposed to KNOW?" With a
pert smile, the woman retorts, "Beats me... why don't you ask your
wife?"' ° Again, the offensiveness of a man's sexual behavior is
measured not by its coerciveness but by its adherence to traditional
morality. This is not to disparage the value of marital fidelity. However,
men might be forgiven if they are still confused when some feminist
leaders laud a book celebrating infidelity by wives"' and when women's
magazines feature such titles as Wives Just Wanna Have Fun.. and For
Some Single Women, There's Nothing Like a MarriedMan. "I
True, the cartoon described above was the work of a man. But, all
things considered, the belief that legal standards formulated by women
will necessarily avoid the "essentialist" or neo-traditionalist trap seems

naive. In a typical comment, Florida state Representative Kathy Chinoy,
a lawyer specializing in sexual-harassment litigation, told Time that she
recommends "a simple litmus test for men who are seeking guidance on
what is appropriate and what is not: 'Would you want your mother, sister
108. Nancy Gibbs, Office Crimes, TIME, Oct. 21, 1991, at 52, 64. Ninety-one
percent of those surveyed think sexual harassment occurs when a male supervisor "insists
on discussing pornographic acts with" a female subordinate, while only 87% think that
sexual harassment occurs when he "asks her to have sex with him." Id.
109. David Horsey, SEATrLE POST INTELLiGENcER, Dec. 10, 1992.
110. See James R. Petersen, Infidelity Chic, PLAYBOY, Nov. 1992, at 56, 56
(describing Gloria Steinem's commentary on Dalma Heyn's book The Erotic Silence of
the American Wife).
111. Linda Kay, Wives Just Wanna Have Fun, CHATELAINE, Mar. 1993, at 91.
112. Courtney Farrell, For Some Single Women, There's Nothing Like a Married
Man, COSMOPOLITAN, Mar. 1993, at 198.
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or daughter exposed to that?"'113 Clearly, this "litmus test" appeals to
the most "patriarchal" of instincts, invoking three categories of women
whose sexual virtue men traditionally have been expected to protect. Many
socially conservative men would probably be intensely disturbed by the
idea of their mothers, daughters, or sisters being "exposed" even to the
most consensual (but "illicit") sexual interaction. This tactic is especially
ironic since many women in the business world have complained that a
major obstacle to their advancement is the unconscious tendency of men
to treat women at the office as they would treat their female intimates.1"'
Finally, it is difficult to imagine that when feminists promote ideas
that appear to reflect traditional notions of sex differences, advocates of
such notions will not seize on the chance to argue that they were right all
along. This is exactly what Rush Limbaugh does in the passage cited
above, when he discusses differences between the way women and men
view sexual harassment and sexual images and sums up, "It just proves
how men and women instinctively and naturally look at events
differently. "115

"'Generalizations about the way women or men are... cannot guide
me reliably in making decisions about particular individuals,' 11 6 Judge
Ruth Bader Ginsburg remarked in 1988. This is no less true if such
generalizations-whether traditionalist or feminist-have some basis in
statistical fact. For example, one survey shows that when high school
students are exposed for the first time to X-rated materials, two-thirds of
the boys but only about forty percent of the girls have a positive reaction
(including a desire to imitate some of the behaviors depicted), while nearly
two-thirds of the girls and only one-third of the boys feel "disgust and
113. Gibbs, supranote 108, at 63. This theme has surfaced elsewhere. For instance,
when Dr. Bernadine Healy, future director of the National Institutes of Health, and then
a professor at Johns Hopkins University Medical School, met with officers of a campus
eating club to voice her grievances about a bawdy skit satirizing her in the club's annual
show, she recounts asking them "how they would have felt if [the skit] was about their
sister, their mother or their wife." Malcolm Gladwell, The Healy Experiment, WASH.
PoST, June 21, 1992 (Magazine) at 9, 10.
114. Jaclyn Fierman, Why Women StillDon't Hit the Top, FORTuNE, July 30, 1990,
at 40, 42. One female executive explained, "'Corporate males still don't know how to
deal with women. They are afraid to yell at them or give them negative feedback. It's
as though they think they are yelling at their mothers or their wives.'" Id. (quoting Ellie
Raynolds, a partner at the headhunting firm Ward Howell International).
115. LIMBAUOH, supra note 87, at 145.
116. Jeffrey Rosen, The Book of Ruth, NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 2, 1993, at 19, 31

(quoting Ginsburg).
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revulsion."117 The gender gap is wide enough to assert that most teenage
males find hardcore sexual materials appealing and most teenage girls find
them revolting, and that greater restrictions on teenagers' access to such
materials would therefore benefit girls."1 Yet such a conclusion would
ignore the experience of two out of five girls (and one out of three boys),
a substantial minority. This is an especially ironic position to take for a
movement that emphasizes relying on women's real-life experiences rather
than on fixed, abstract categories.
The point is not to claim that all junior high school students of both
sexes ought to become enthusiastic consumers of X-rated materials, but
rather to suggest that whatever approach is taken needs to be far more
subtle and flexible than a clear-cut division by gender-whether based on
biological sex or on presumed power differences.
V. DoEs SEXUAL VICTIMHOOD ENDANGER REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS?

If the central theme of protective feminist victimology is the triad of
rape/sexuaf harassment/pornography, the central theme of the conservative
victimology of women (in addition to pornography) is abortion. Over the
last decade in right-to-life rhetoric, the image of the woman who
terminates a pregnancy has shifted from one of promiscuous, selfish
murderess to the less threatening one of victim. A 1992 full-page
advertisement in the New York Times, entitled A New American Compact:
Caring about Women, Caringfor the Unborn," 9 asserts that the right to
abortion "has ushered in a new era of irresponsibility toward
women."" 2 Increasingly, right-to-life advocates claim that a woman
faced with the crisis of an unwanted pregnancy needs compassion and help
(including day care, maternity leave, and other social programs) but
instead is left to fend for herself and forced to rely on the false solution
of abortion.' If she had the support she needed to raise a baby, she
117. U.S. ATTORNEY GEN.'S COMM'N ON PORNOGRAPHY: Hearings in Houston,
Tex. 7 (Sept. 11, 1985) (testimony of Dr. Jennings Bryant). This study was based on 600
telephone interviews conducted in a mid-size Midwestern city. Its scientific validity is
somewhat compromised by the high refusal rate (60% of all calls). Id.
118. Id. However, males in the same survey were more likely than females to say
that their first exposureto hardeore materials was "harmful." Forty-one percent ofjunior
high school males responded "harmful," while 21% responded "appealing." Females
were more likely to describe it as "neutral." Id.
119. Advertisement, N.Y. TINMs, July 14, 1992, at A23.
120. Id.
121. See id. ("Abortion is defended today as a means of ensuring the equality and
independenceof women, and as a solution to the problems of single parenting .... The
sad truth is that the abortion license has proven to be a disaster for women. .. ").
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would undoubtedly want to be a mother. (And if she still doesn't, she
should just try harder: "The simplest solution to the problem of unwanted
children is to want them,"" = writes anti-abortion activist Joan Andrews,
who was imprisoned for vandalizing an abortion clinic.)
On the feminist side, Greer takes much the same view:
Abortion is the last in a long line of non-choices that could begin
... with the time and the place and the manner of love-making.
...
[T]he choice to end [a pregnancy] can only be a genuine
choice if the pregnant woman has other alternatives. If she will
lose her lodgings and her job or her educational opportunities if
she has a baby, then she has no choice at all. If her boyfriend
threatens to leave her if she does not accept termination.., her
right to choose is being ignored."

Abortion is thus redefined as exploitation of women by profiteering
abortionists, by selfish boyfriends or husbands, and by other (usually
male) villains. Pro-life women's groups bear such names as Women
Exploited by Abortion and American Victims of Abortion. 11 "Of all the
things which are done to women to fit them into a society dominated by
men, abortion is the most violent invasion of their physical and psychic
integrity,"" argues pro-life writer Daphne de Jong, who describes
herself as a feminist. "It is a deeper and more destructive assault than
rape, the culminating act of womb-envy and woman-hatred . . .
This reinterpretation has also allowed the right-to-life movement to find
a victim group that can speak for its cause: women who regret having had
an abortion.
122. GALLAHER, supra note 2, at 245.
123. Greer, supra note 17, at 21-22. Like the most extreme of the right-to-lifers,
Greer appears to reject not only abortion but birth control as well: "To accept
contraception is to choose between two unacceptable alternatives, forced pregnancy or
temporary infertility with a greater or lesser degree of present discomfort or malaise and
unknown... long-term consequences." id. at 22.
124. Women Exploited by Abortion is a national organization that claimed to have
30,000 supporters in 1985. See Marilyn Balamaci et al., Eight Other Women's Stories,
PEOPLE, Aug. 5, 1985, at 82, 83. American Victims of Abortion is a "post-abortion
support system for women" that claims to have members in every state. See Janet
Cawley, The Stakes Are High, and So Are Emotions, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 26, 1989, at C14.
125. Daphne de Jong, Legal Abortion Exploits Women, in ABORTION: OPPOSING
VIEWPOINTS 183, 185 (Charles P. Cozic & Stacey L. Tipp eds., 1991).

126. Id.
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"My child died because of Roe v. Wade," Olivia Gans, the head of
American Victims of Abortion, declared on an NBC News panel following
the broadcast of a television movie about the historic abortion rights
case."n When an opposing panelist pointed out that it was she who made
the choice and Roe merely enabled her to do so, Gans retorted, "It was
a choice I was forced to make, because of the pressure of the
abortionist."" To Gans and other right-to-lifers who frame their
opposition to abortion in a feminist language, no woman could make a
truly voluntary choice to "kill her baby."
Uncannily, this logic echoes that of the anti-pornography feminists
who claim that no woman could make a truly voluntary choice to
participate in sexually explicit performances. In a Harvard lecture,
Catharine MacKinnon sarcastically inquired why it is that "'when a
woman spreads her legs for a camera, she is assumed to be exercising free
will?'"
How different can it be when a woman spreads her legs for
a suction machine? If, according to the Massachusetts bill on
pornography,1 3' a woman can be found to have been coerced into
pornography even if she "signed a contract, or made statements affirming
a willingness to cooperate in the production of the pornography" 13 ' and
"no physical force, threats, or weapons were used in the making of the
pornography,"" could the same type of law allowing women to sue for
"coercion into abortion" be used to shut down abortion clinics?
In more ways than one, the view of women as victims of abortion is
inextricably bound to the view of women as victims of sex. Significantly,
in her own writings on the issue, MacKinnon explicitly eschews, even
condemns, the traditional feminist perspective that stresses choice and
privacy: "When the law of privacy restricts intrusions into intimacy, it
bars change in control over that intimacy .... This right to privacy is a
right of men 'to be let alone' to oppress women one at a time."133
MacKinnon declares that she supports the right to abortion, but on the
grounds that the exception most abortion opponents make for cases of rape
should be extended to all sexual intercourse because "[fleminist
127. NBC News Panel (NBC television broadcast, May 15, 1989).
128. Id.
129. Strebeigh, supra note 34, at 53 (quoting MacKinnon).
130. An Act to Protect the Civil Rights of Women and Children, H.R. 5194, Mass.
177th Gen. Ct., 1992 Sess. (1992) (unenacted; not yet refiled as of 1993 Session).
131. Id. § 2(2)(a)(11).
132. Id. § 2(2)(a)(12).
133. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, Privacy v. Equality: Beyond Roe v. Wade, in
FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 93, 101-02 (1987) (citation omitted).
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investigations suggest" that sex seldom is "meaningfully voluntary for
women. "134

But if the "forced sex" argument can be used to support abortion
rights, it can also be used to oppose them. The availability of abortion,
many conservatives argue, removes one reason women had for saying no
to sex. According to "A New American Compact,"' 5 access to abortion
has "encouraged irresponsible or predatory men, who find abortion a
convenient justification for their lack of commitment."" And, in fact,
MacKinnon concurs:
So long as women do not control access to our sexuality, abortion
facilitates women's heterosexual availability. . . . [U]nder
conditions of gender inequality, sexual liberation in this sense
does not free women; it frees male sexual aggression. The
availability of abortion removes the one remaining legitimized
reason that women have had for refusing sex besides the
headache. 37
(Here, the logic-such as it is-of MacKinnon's argument begins to
disintegrate: if "male sexual aggression" could be deterred by a woman's
fear of pregnancy, how coercive could it be?) She also suggests that the
real motive behind the legalization of abortion was "subordinating
women's collective needs to the imperatives of male supremacy,"138
pointing to the sinister fact that the Playboy Foundation has been a
longtime supporter of abortion rights. One senses that if MacKinnon could
be persuaded that banning abortion would be an effective means of making
women less heterosexually available, pornography might not be the only

grounds of her alliance with the right.
Of course, one could point out that the right to abortion allows women
to say yes to sex-even sex without commitment-when that is what they
want. But as we have seen, both the conservatives and the protective
feminists appear to believe that women rarely do. And if they think they
do, they just don't know what's good for them.
134. Id. at 94-95.

135.
136.
137.
138.

Advertisement, supra note 119.
Id.
MACKiNNON, supra note 133, at 99.
Id. at 97.
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VI. THE PLEASURES AND PERILS OF VICTIMHOOD:
FROM THE WEAKER SEX TO THE POWERLESS SEX

In a society where a strong commitment to righting past wrongs-or
at least the desire to create the appearance of such a commitment-exists
in many institutions, from legislatures and courts to the media, a claim of
"victim status" confers certain privileges. This is one of the seductions of
the victim mentality.
For a parallel, one may consider Shelby Steele's insightful analysis of
the role of victimhood in the black community. 1 "Like all victims,
what blacks lost in power they gained in innocence-innocence that, in
turn, entitled them to pursue power,"14 ° writes Steele.
Victimization is a broad, somewhat sloppy word that one can
apply to oneself in the most subjective of ways. And when we do
think of ourselves as victims, we are released from responsibility

for some difficulty, spared some guilt and accountability. Our
innocence is restored because an injustice was done to us.14
In the hands of protective feminists, victim power can become an
entitlement to censor materials others can read or watch, to control such
nonviolent behaviors as winks in the street, to excuse crimes committed

by women,"

or to demand that charges of sexual violation made by

women against men be exempt from the scrutiny normally required by the
legal system."t In political discourse, it can also be used to demand that
139. See SHELBY STEEL, THE Coirruir OF OuR CHARACTER (1990).
140.
141.
142.
LEDGER

Id. at 14.
Id. at 67.
See, e.g., Bill Riley et al., Irene Seale Sentenced to 20 Years, THE STAR(Newark, N.J.), Jan. 26, 1993, at 1. In the 1993 New Jersey case of Irene

Seale, convicted of kidnapping in the abduction and death of Exxon executive Sidney
Reso, Dr. Lenore Walker, the prominent expert on battered woman syndrome, submitted
a report for the defense. Dr. Walker's report argued that Seale was a victim of her

husband (with whom she participated in the kidnapping and extortion scheme), and, as
a battered wife, had become so numb to her feelings that "'Sidney Reso was not a real
person to her.'" Id. at 19. There appeared to be no evidence that Seale had been abused.
Id.
143. It is true that traditional standards of proof in rape cases, such as the
requirement of "earnest resistance," imposed on women a burden that was not imposed

on victims of other violent crimes (such as robbery). The increasingly popular view that
an accused rapist can be convicted solely on the victim's word, even when there is a

plausible scenario of consent, however, raises thorny issues of the presumption of
innocence and proof beyond a reasonable doubt. So, to an even greater extent, do some
recent legal developments suggesting that mere absence of "expressed consent" on the
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the arguments of persons claiming victimization be exempt from normal
scrutiny, criticism, or the requirements of consistency or logic.
Again, a parallel from Steele is appropriate: "[W]hen blacks take the
floor and point to their difficulties as evidence of victimization, refutation
is not easy-it feels like a continuation of the act of victimizing, like
blaming the victim." 1" When a victim of gang rape passionately insists
that Hustler was partly responsible for her violation; when a woman
emotionally manipulated into unwanted sex equates her experience with
sexual assault; when a woman pressured by a boyfriend into terminating
a pregnancy says that legal abortion has killed her child, a rational
counter-argument in the face of such intense personal pain seems cold and
insensitive. However, as Steele also points out, "victim power" has
serious drawbacks: "It is a formula that binds the victim to his
victimization ....
Social victims may be collectively entitled, but they
are all too often individually demoralized."" When women workers or
students are told that because of their gender they have less power than
men who appear to be their social equals, or that they should feel
demeaned, threatened, and intimidated when a man shows sexual interest
in them, surely that can have a demoralizing effect.
If a woman who submits to unwanted sex without indicating her
unwillingness can be considered a rape victim because, in the words of a
campus sexual-assault counselor, women are "'culturally indoctrinated to
not question people in authority'" and "'[c]ulturally, men are in a position
of authority just by virtue of being men,'" " more women may really
feel that they cannot say no.
Assumptions of female passivity and psychological helplessness cannot
fail to have a damaging, if not devastating, effect on how women are
perceived in society. If a woman can be considered a victim of "coercion
into pornography" even when she has signed a contract, was compensated,
and was not physically threatened or intimidated, this calls into question
women's competence to sign any contract. To be held not responsible for
one's actions is to be treated as a child. The way women perceive
themselves is affected as well.
It is commonly accepted that certain, often subtle, gender-based social
disadvantages continue to affect women. Yet the relative diversity of social
norms that has existed in the United States in the last several decades
part of the alleged victim can be sufficient for a finding of rape. See State ex rel.
M.T.S., 609 A.2d 1266, 1279-80 (N.J. 1992).
144. STEELE, supra note 139, at 67.
145. Id. at 14.
146. Cathy Young, Beyond 'No Means No. Redefining Date Rape, INSIGHT, Aug.
16, 1993, at 16, 18 (quoting Ruth Anne Koenick, Coordinator of Sexual Assault Services
at Rutgers University in New Jersey).
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ensures that all women are not affected similarly by the same socialization
processes, and that many women as individuals have remarkable
opportunities to overcome the debilitating effects of socialization. We can
seek to achieve female empowerment either by expanding such
opportunities or by formally recognizing women's powerlessness as
grounds for active redistribution of power in their favor. To some, the
latter approach would seem more efficient. Yet adopting it would mean
discounting the experience of at least two generations of women whose
professional and educational achievements, while not yet numerically on
a par with those of men, make the label of "powerless" dubious, if not
insulting. It would also mean, regardless of intentions, resegregating
women into a protected class. The powerless sex may be only an updated
and politicized euphemism for the "weaker sex."
Protective feminists argue that women's position as "relative
newcomers" in the workplace, whose professional status is more
vulnerable and therefore more likely to be undermined by ridicule or
attention to sexuality, makes them legitimately more sensitive to such
behavior than men.147
Empirically, this observation is undoubtedly true. But facts can lead
to different conclusions. Take, for instance, an episode from the career of
Dr. Bernadine Healy, later the director of the National Institutes of
Health. In 1982, as a cardiologist at Johns Hopkins University medical
school-and, in her own words, "'one of the leaders of that
institution"'" 5-Healy became the subject of a bawdy skit in the annual
show of a campus eating club, which also ridiculed her ex-husband, who
was a faculty member as well. But it was only Healy who tenaciously
complained, insisting that the skit constituted sexual harassment and an
attack on her reputation; she demanded a list of the participants' names
and finally threatened a lawsuit. (Resulting tensions with colleagues
eventually led Healy to leave the university.)' 49
It is certainly understandable that, as one of a relatively small number
of women occupying a high position in a traditionally male institution,
Healy would see the satire as damaging in a way that a man would not.
Nonetheless, her reaction cannot fail to suggest some disturbing
conclusions, such as: women are too delicate to take the same ridicule as
147. See, e.g., Abrams, supranote 61, at 1205 ("[Miany women view their position
in the workplace as marginal or precarious[, thus, tihey are likely to construe disturbing
personal interactions, stereotypical views ... , or other affronts to their competence as
workers as serious judgments about their ability to succeed in the work environment.").
148. Gladwell, supra note 113, at 10 (quoting Healy).
149. See id.
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men, 15 or women in positions of power are less tolerant of challenges
to their authority than men. To legitimize and institutionalize such an
approach poses its own dangers. Writes Katie Roiphe:
To declare that [women's] authority is vulnerable to a dirty joke
from someone of inferior status just because that person happens
to be a man is to undermine their position. Female authority is
not (and should not be seen as) so fragile that it shatters at the
first sign of male sexuality. Any rules saying otherwise strip
women, in the public eye, of their hard-earned authority.'
Thus, the "powerlessness"
prophecy.

of women can become a self-fulfilling

VII. CONCLUSION

Many people sympathize with certain aspects of protective feminism,

including the call for censorship, because they are genuinely appalled by
the violent victimization of women in contemporary American society.
The horrific reality of sexual and nonsexual assault many women

experience is undeniable, although there are many reasons to believe that
the scope of this violence has less to do with gender bias than with the
general prevalence of violence in our culture. Women are ill-served when
the physical dangers they face are exaggerated while those faced by men
are downplayed. 52

To acknowledge the reality of sexual coercion, and to take it
seriously, should not lead us to turn sexual assault and sexual danger into
the central and normative fact of women's lives-or, more dangerously
still, to recast any expression of male sexual interest as a possible prelude
to rape. Nor do women benefit when their greater sexual vulnerability is
absolutized and made into a basis for protected legal status. Ultimately, a
150. Explaining her reaction, Healy told the Washington Post, "I had just gone
through a divorce. I was very vulnerable." But so, presumably, was her husband. See
id.
151. RoiPHE, supra note 1, at 90.
152. Not only are men more likely to be victims of all personal violence, but they
are not as immune to sexual assault as much feminist discourse of rape would seem to
suggest: 5 to 10% of victims of rape outside ofprisons may be male. See, e.g., Bruce
D. Forman, Reported Male Rape, 7 VIcTIMoLOOY 235, 236 (1982); Arthur Kaufman,
et al.,
Male Rape Victims: NoninstitutionalizedAssault, 137 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 221,
221-23 (1980); see also U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
FEMALE VICTIMS OF VIOLENT CRIME 7 (1991) (reporting that on average, 13,200 men
fall victim to rape each year, out of a total annual average of 167,700 victims).
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female identity rooted in violation is hardly compatible with a female
identity rooted in competence and autonomy-an identity that, today, is
within women's reach as never before in human history.

